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This study is a successful proof of concept of using automated text analysis to accurately classify transcribed 911
homicide calls according to their veracity. Fifty matched, caller-side transcripts were labeled as truthful or deceptive
based on the subsequent adjudication of the cases. We mined the transcripts and analyzed a set of linguistic
features supported by deception theories. Our results suggest that truthful callers display more negative emotion
and anxiety and provide more details for emergency workers to respond to the call. On the other hand, deceivers
attempt to suppress verbal responses by using more negation and assent words. Using these features as input
variables, we trained and tested several machine-learning classification algorithms and compared the results with
the output from a statistical classification technique, discriminant analysis. The overall performance of the
classification techniques was as high as 84% for the cross-validated set. The promising results of this study illustrate
the potential of using automated linguistic analyses in crime investigations.
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In part due to a natural “truth bias,” humans (including
those with special training) can generally detect deception
at a rate only slightly better than chance, at around 54%
[1,2]. This inability to accurately separate truth from de-
ception can have serious consequences; this is particularly
true in the case of law enforcement. Not only do criminal
investigators have to be concerned with deception that is
not detected (false negatives), but they must also take into
account the serious outcome of labeling truth tellers as
deceivers (false positives). Thus, there is a critical need for
more reliable and accurate methods of identifying decep-
tion, especially in the earliest contact between a suspected
perpetrator and law enforcement. In this study, we evalu-
ate linguistic cues extracted from transcriptions of 911
homicidea calls as potential indicators of deception.
As a dataset, 911 calls may be ideal for deception detec-
tion research because they occur in a real-world setting,
are relatively unrehearsed, occur soon after the crime in
question, and are part of emotionally charged situations
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reproduction in any medium, provided the origoften sanctioned, the consequences of lying and getting
caught are minor, and incentives to deceive are artificial
(e.g., [5,6]). Thus, as Mann et al. [7] suggest, these low-
stakes laboratory environments may not induce feelings of
guilt or elicit behavior found in real settings; as a result,
they may adversely affect researchers’ ability to accurately
judge credibility, and therefore diminish the external val-
idity of the results. Thus, it is important to add real-world
scenarios to the collection of deception research data.
Deception studies using real-world person-of-interest
statements begin to address the research gap identified
above [8–10]. Person-of-interest statements are written
explanations of crimes by a person who has not been for-
mally charged with a crime but who is “of interest” to law
enforcement in an investigation. Studies have been con-
ducted using pre-polygraph interviews, which also involve
real-world data [11]. However, relative to 911 calls, the
time between the crime and the statements in pre-
polygraph interviews is much longer, giving deceivers time
to rehearse their responses. Additionally, such datasets
may be influenced by investigative procedures or the de-
ceiver’s contact with acquaintances between the incident
and the statement [4,12]. Thus, 911 calls may be considered
a less biased dataset because the interaction with authorities
occurs much sooner after the crime and the individual’sis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
mmons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
inal work is properly cited.
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fore, this dataset provides researchers an unusual opportun-
ity for an unfiltered look at deception.
A subset of 911 calls reporting homicides are available
on the Internet because they are high-profile crimes.
The calls can be corroborated for ground truth by exam-
ining the associated court outcomes. Establishing ground
truth is one of the most difficult aspects of research into
deception detection [13]. Because initial homicide re-
ports, subsequent investigations, legal proceedings, and
judgments are covered widely by news media, it is pos-
sible to substantiate ground truth to a high degree of
certainty for these types of 911 calls. Although 911
homicide calls represent an extremely small fraction of
total 911 calls, they can serve as a proxy for calls made
reporting other high-profile crimes such as arson, bomb
threats, and sexual assault.
Data mining techniques, including text mining, lin-
guistic feature mining, and classification by text features,
can be used to analyze the “caller side” of the transcripts
of these calls. Text mining involves looking for hidden
patterns or cues in texts, while linguistic feature mining
refers to dissecting texts with respect to specific linguis-
tic categories, such as words associated with positive
affect. Text mining is a multidisciplinary research area
that combines approaches used in the fields of computer
science, linguistics, mathematics, communication, and
psychology. It focuses on using computing power to
process unstructured human language in spoken or writ-
ten form [5]; furthermore, text mining has been used to
process text data to discover linguistic cues or features in
order to classify documents, including fraudulent versus
non-fraudulent financial statements [14,15] or deceptive
versus truthful statements in instant messages, email ex-
changes, or person-of-interest statements [6–10,16].
In this study, we applied linguistic feature mining to
evenly matched (i.e., deceptive matched with truthful)
transcripts of 911 homicide calls via Linguistic Inquiry
and Word Count (LIWC). LIWC 2007, a general-purpose
psychosocial linguistic dictionary comprising 4,500 words
and word stems, has been used by researchers to quantify
linguistic cues for deception [16–19].
This paper contributes to research streams in security
informatics, deception detection, and crime analysis in
the following ways:
1) Using a truthful/deceptive matched convenience
data set of fifty 911 calls, we identify linguistic cues
based on deception theories that may be used to
discriminate between deceptive and truthful 911
calls;
2) We extract useful information from unstructured
text comprised of transcribed 911 calls to
demonstrate that the largely unexploited data of 911calls can be analyzed for further investigative work;
and
3) The classification results achieve up to 84% accuracy.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: we
first review deception theories and previous research in-
volving automated or manual deception detection; we
then examine advantages and disadvantages of using 911
calls as a data source and discuss linguistic cues of de-
ceptive and truthful 911 callers as we develop our re-
search question and hypotheses; next we describe our
methodology, and finally we present and discuss the re-
sults, research contributions, limitations of the study,
and future research directions.
Literature review
Deception is defined as purposefully concealing the
truth, either by omission or commission. In the present
study, our general hypothesis is that 911 callers who de-
ceive exhibit systematic differences in the words they
use compared to 911 callers who are telling the truth.
Possible underlying causes for the differences in decep-
tive speech are described by deception theories, includ-
ing four factor theory [20], interpersonal deception
theory (IDT) [21], information manipulation theory [22],
and reality monitoring [23]. Deception detection re-
searchers rely on theory to identify strategically
employed clues that can discriminate between those
who deceive and those who do not. In this study, we rely
on four factor theory and IDT because they best fit the
interpersonal context of a 911 call.
Four factor theory [20] delineates four processes or
factors that underlie deceivers’ behaviors. Control, the
first process, describes how deceivers control or sup-
press their behavior to try to conceal their deception.
For example, in 911 calls, deceivers will manage the lin-
guistic and paralinguistic features of their interaction
with the dispatcher in order to appear as truthful as pos-
sible and not to induce suspicion. The second factor,
arousal, refers to various autonomic arousal responses
of the deceiver’s central nervous system that coincide
with the deceptive behavior or story. Felt emotion, the
third factor, encompasses various emotions that de-
ceivers experience, specifically guilt, anxiety, and/or sat-
isfaction in pulling the wool over others’ eyes (i.e.
“duping delight”). For instance, because of the negative
feelings associated with guilt, deceivers try to disassoci-
ate themselves from their crime by referring to others
rather than to the self through a greater use of through
the use third-person pronouns. Anxiety may also impair
the quality of the control that deceivers use to conceal
their deception. Finally, due to the fourth factor, cogni-
tive processing, deceivers have an increased cognitive
load as they fabricate and maintain lies. This factor ties
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load may be detrimental to a liar’s performance and in-
crease the chances of detection. Because of this, de-
ceivers in 911 calls may shorten their responses and use
a smaller set of words.
According to IDT [21,24], deception is goal-oriented
and strategic. Arising out of interpersonal communica-
tion and deception research, IDT predicts the behaviors
of senders and receivers in an interactive contextb. The
theory acknowledges the “superordinate role” of the con-
text and relationship within which the interaction oc-
curs. For example, the situational factors of a 911
homicide call will influence how deceptive exchanges
play out, and consequently, the hypotheses regarding
these exchanges. IDT proposes that the behavior of the
deceiver will vary systematically with the spontaneity of
the interaction (i.e., lying to a 911 operator requires
more dexterity than lying in a written letter) and the im-
mediacy of the context. In 911 calls, the interaction is
spatially non-immediate, but temporally immediate. IDT
also predicts that deceivers are strategic in managing the
information they send, their image, and their behavior;
as a result, however, they experience nonstrategic bypro-
ducts including dampened affect, noninvolvement, and
performance decrements. In the current study, callers
should experience increased cognitive loads relative to
most contexts, making deception even more difficult.
The increased stakes and spontaneity of the conversation
may impair deceptive performance.
These theories lend support to the feasibility of using
linguistic analysis to carry out deception detection. To
discern these deceptive patterns in communication,
many recent studies involving automated linguistic cue
analyses have leveraged a general-purpose, psychosocial
dictionary such as LIWC [5,8-10,25-27]. LIWC contains
predefined categories composed of words related to a
particular construct, such as Anxiety or Negative Emo-
tion. Depending on the context in which deception oc-
curs, deceivers have been found to display elevated
uncertainty and affect, share fewer details, provide more
spatiotemporal details, and use less diverse and less
complex language than truth tellers [17,26,28]. Re-
searchers have also documented cases in which deceivers
use more words, group references and use more infor-
mal, non-immediate language than truth tellers [6,9,29].
Researchers who have conducted manual content ana-
lyses have also documented linguistic markers of decep-
tion [30]; for example, perpetrators of homicide or
kidnapping may use past tense (vs. present or future)
when discussing the victim, and deceivers may try to dis-
tance themselves from the crime by using “they” rather
than “I” in statements [4]. Law enforcement researchers
[3,4] were successful in manually coding verbal indica-
tors to classify 911 homicide callers as “guilty” or“innocent.” In these studies, the key verbal indicators of
guilt included extraneous information, inappropriate po-
liteness, a lack of plea for help, and evasion. In an earlier
study, Olsson [31] analyzed emergency calls made to re-
port fires in London, UK. He found that hoax calls could
be discriminated from truthful ones based on how the
caller described or implied his/her relationship to the
emergency and the urgency and cooperation of the
caller.
The original mode of communication (i.e., written vs.
spoken language) is particularly important with respect
to linguistic cues that distinguish between truth tellers
and deceivers. As noted in IDT, deception is strategic
and the spontaneity of the interaction is important
[21,24]. Thus, for example, a team tasked with writing
the text to include with financial statements has months
in which to develop a document that may include stra-
tegic misrepresentation or obfuscation via increasing
word count and employing words of more than three
syllables [14,15]. On the other hand, a person calling a
911 operator after committing a crime has far less time
for strategic wordsmithery and may use fewer, simpler
words to suppress or control verbal cues for deception.
Research question and hypotheses
Contrary to media hype regarding highly publicized
crimes, most 911 calls are not full of drama, excitement,
and/or rich descriptions of the crime, crime scene, or
victim(s). The 911 operator is trained to elicit informa-
tion to deploy the right emergency resources as quickly
as possible. Although a dramatic outpouring of emotion
may be observed in some calls, most 911 calls comprised
a great deal of mundane information gathering and in-
formation passing to clarify names, addresses, and direc-
tions; give life-saving instructions (such as the steps to
perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)); and ask
questions that only require a one-word answer (e.g., “is
the victim breathing?”).
There are several key advantages to using automated
linguistic analysis techniques to detect deception in tran-
scripts of 911 homicide calls. First, 911 calls represent
the initial contact between a caller and an emergency re-
sponse team, including law enforcement, leaving callers
little time to prepare or to settle down for the encounter.
Moreover, as noted above, the caller’s statement has not
yet been corrupted by contact with criminal investigators
or lawyers [4]. Furthermore, because callers do not per-
ceive 911 operators to be members of law enforcement,
deceptive callers may exhibit less controlled behavior
and more cues of deception; consequently, 911 callers
may become more engaged in interpersonal communica-
tion and be less guarded because 911 operators inter-
view rather than interrogate. Due to the temporal
immediacy of the crime in relation to the 911 call, there
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causing the caller to display more deceptive cues. Another
advantage for comparison of truthful and deceptive re-
sponses in emergency calls is that 911 operators use a
structured interview style that was similar across calls.
On the other hand, there are a number of issues with
911 calls that make them a less than ideal source for lin-
guistic analysis. First, these calls can be very short. In
the dataset used for this study, calls ranged from less
than thirty seconds to over ten minutes in length. On
average, the calls were about three to four minutes. An-
other problem is that there can be a lot of dead air time
while the 911 operator puts the caller on hold to coord-
inate with the rest of the emergency team; such gaps
cannot be used in linguistic analyses. Third the sound
quality of the calls can make them difficult to transcribe.
Fourth, dispatchers, operators, callers, and rescue
workers may talk simultaneously. Fifth, certain sounds
such as sobs, shrieks, or gasps of pain cannot be easily
transcribed and/or analyzed using current linguistic fea-
ture dictionaries. Finally, a caller may be poised to offer
what could prove to be valuable clues to future investi-
gators, but 911 operators may have to interrupt them to
elicit the best information for timely dispatching of the
right resources. Consequently, to accomplish their pri-
mary mission, the operators who perform both call-
taking and dispatching functions may restrict “telling”
cues or information [32].
The strengths of the dataset ultimately outweigh the
potential weaknesses of the dataset. Thus, we analyzed
cues in transcribed 911 calls using the same approach
that other researchers have adopted to analyze unstruc-
tured texts with a view to distinguish between deceivers
and truth tellers. Based on IDT, four factor theory, and
previous research, we considered that deceivers may try
too hard to cover up what they perceive to be deceptive
cues. For example, in a face-to-face context, deceivers
may try to limit fidgeting and/or posture shifts, thereby
displaying more “stillness” during a lie in an attempt to
inhibit overt signs of deception [28]. In the circum-
stances of this study, where callers are not visible, decep-
tive 911 callers may restrict their verbal responses,
exhibiting low affect or shortened responses when com-
pared to truth tellers. This may be observed in a higher
rate of negation and assent words (e.g., “no” and “yes”)
that may be used by deceivers to limit and control an-
swers. Deceivers may also feel emotions such as guilt,
anxiety, and/or duping delight [33]. To lessen these feel-
ings, they may attempt to distance themselves from the
situation. The use of first-person singular constructs im-
plies that the speaker “owns” the statement. However,
because liars try to distance themselves [34] from the
crime or bad situation, they include fewer self-references
in retelling stories [17]. Thus, we should find thatdeceptive 911 callers use more third-person plural to
share the blame.
Four factor theory posits that cognitive effort is re-
quired to not only lie, but also to maintain the lie. Vrij,
Fisher, Mann, and Leal [35] expand upon this claim and
outline all of the tasks a deceiver undertakes that in-
crease cognitive load, including developing a plausible
lie, self-monitoring for credibility, monitoring the lis-
tener, and remembering the details of the lie while con-
cealing the truth. In short, they argue that lying requires
strategic intent and more cognitive effort than truth tell-
ing. To mitigate these effects, a liar may rehearse his or
her story to keep the facts and details in order. However,
because deceptive 911 callers have often had little op-
portunity to rehearse between the time of the crime and
the time of the call, they may face extreme cognitive
overload. Thus, these callers may compensate by supply-
ing shorter, controlled statements, sharing fewer details
with emergency responders (such as those that would be
helpful in locating the physical address of the victim),
and asking the 911 operators to “hold on” or “wait”
when the operator gives instructions.
Based on these theories and building on previous re-
search on deception detection using linguistic cue ana-
lysis, our research question is as follows:
Can automated linguistic analysis techniques
accurately classify deceptive versus truthful callers in
transcripts of 911 homicide calls?
To define the types of cues that can be examined for
deception or truthfulness in 911 calls, we suggest that
truth tellers will exhibit more immediacy through
greater use of first-person singular and first-person
plural words. On the other hand, we expect deceivers
will show more non-immediacy, a distancing from what
is said, by referencing others in the third-person singular
or plural. To control verbal output, or to suppress reac-
tions or answers, deceivers will tend to answer more fre-
quently with shorter, simpler “yes” or “no” answers.
Because deceivers tend to suppress reactions, we expect
that truth tellers will display more felt emotion. On the
other hand, we anticipate that deceivers will use more
swear words because instances of swearing can be per-
ceived as more credible [36]. Thus, deceivers may in-
clude swear words as a way to appear to be emotionally
connected to an incident while suppressing their true
emotions. Relative to deceivers, truth tellers have a lower
cognitive overload that allows them to give more location
details, such as house numbers and generic information
about location. Truth tellers want to provide many clues
to get rescue teams to their location as quickly as pos-
sible, and will therefore provide specific addresses and
phone numbers more clearly, as well as giving more
Table 1 Constructs and corresponding LIWC categories
Constructs LIWC categories
Immediacy 1st person plural, 1st person singular
Non-immediacy 3rd person singular; 3rd person plural
Control Assent; Negate
Felt Emotion Negative emotion; Anxiety
Lack of felt emotion Extreme swearing
Cognitive overload Inhibition
Lack of cognitive overload Numbers; Leisure (location-related)
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or apartment building. Finally, due to cognitive overload
deceivers may be reluctant, or find it difficult to follow
life-saving instructions given by the dispatcher even
though not doing so would seem suspicious.
Formally stated, the hypotheses in this study are as
follows:
Deceptive 911 callers will display:
(a) higher use of third-person plural, (b) higher use of
third-person singular, (c) more assent terms, (d) more
negation terms, (e) more emotionally-charged swear-
ing, (f ) more inhibition words, and
(g) lower use of first-person plural, (h) lower use of
first-person singular, (i) less negative emotion, (j) less
anxiety, (k) lower use of numbers, and (l) lower use of
generic location details than truthful 911 callers.
Methodology
Our dataset represented a convenience sample obtained
from publicly available sources found on the Internet.
The majority of the calls came from Dispatch Magazine
On-Line (911dispatch.com). This resource contains a
tape library of public domain 911 and other emergency
calls that have been collected since 2006. The website
contains documentation about the calls that enables the
user to determine the outcome of the case.
Because we do not have control over the chain of cus-
tody of these 911 calls, we cannot state to what degree
they were edited. For the most part, personally identifying
information has been redacted, but we have no reason to
believe that the calls were edited otherwise. However, the
inability to state this conclusively is a potential limitation
of this convenience dataset. Still, the archive presents a
unique opportunity to access this type of real-world data.
The final dataset of 50 transcribed 911 calls was
equally split between truthful and deceptive callers. The
size of the dataset was restricted by the number of pub-
licly available deceptive calls for which ground truth
could be established. To establish ground truth, we cor-
roborated subsequent arraignment, prosecution, and/or
admission of guilt via news articles about the crimes
based on the information at the source website and
other websites as necessary. Once we had identified 25
deceptive calls, we randomly chose 25 calls from our set
of transcribed truthful calls to create a matched set.
After transcribing the calls and removing the 911 opera-
tors’ side of the conversations, we analyzed the caller
side of the transcripts using LIWC. LIWC normalizes
the data by dividing category counts by the number of
words in each document.
As summarized in Table 1, the various constructs that
we examined comprised one to several linguistic cues as
defined in LIWC. The immediacy of truth tellers wasanticipated to be observable in greater use of First-
Person Plural and First-Person Singular terms (LIWC
categories). Conversely, we expected deceivers to show
more non-immediacy by referencing others in the Third-
Person Singular or Third-Person Plural (LIWC categor-
ies). Deceivers would also tend to answer with more
Negation terms (LIWC category) or more Assent terms
(LIWC category) answers as part of control. We ex-
pected that truth tellers would display more felt emotion
via the LIWC categories of Negative Emotion and Anx-
iety than deceivers. In contrast, we anticipated that de-
ceivers, who would attempt to fake an emotional
connection while suppressing their true emotions, would
use more swear words (LIWC category = Sexual (in-
cludes emotionally-charged swear words)). Also due to
cognitive overload, deceivers might be reluctant to initi-
ate CPR or other first aid efforts (LIWC category = In-
hibition). Meanwhile, the lack of cognitive overload
would enable truth tellers to give more location details
such as house numbers (LIWC category = Number) or
location-related words such as “garage” or “apartment”
(the LIWC category that includes these location words =
Leisure).
The first step for identifying significant linguistic cues
was to run a one-tailed independent sample t-test for
each linguistic cue to compare truth tellers with de-
ceivers. We considered each 911 call transcript to be an
independent observation, since it represented one call
placed by a unique caller.
Next, we trained various machine-learning classifica-
tion algorithms on the cues and tested their classifica-
tion accuracy using 10-fold cross-validation as a bootstrap
technique to increase the validity of the results. The fol-
lowing machine-learning algorithms were selected to
classify the 911 calls because of their theoretically diverse
foundations: logistic model tree induction, naïve Bayes,
neural network, and random forest. Classification by one
statistical technique, discriminant analysis, was also per-
formed. Table 2 reports the results for each classification
method.
Each machine-learning algorithm builds a model based
on a different set of theoretical premises. Logistic tree
Table 2 Results of Classification Algorithms
Classification methods Logistic model tree
induction
Naïve Bayes Random forest Neural network Discriminant
analysis
Training Cross-valid Training Cross-valid Training Cross-valid Training Cross-valid Training Cross-valid
Overall performance 98% 82% 90% 78% 100% 70% 82% 74% 96% 84%
Truth performance 100% 82% 88% 76% 100% 64% 84% 64% 96% 88%
Deception performance 96% 84% 92% 80% 100% 76% 80% 84% 96% 80%
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using regression functions as base learners [37]. A sim-
ple naïve Bayes is a probabilistic classifier based on
Bayes’ theorem. A neural network is a “black box” that
performs a classification using hidden layers. A random
forest is a type of decision tree that applies decision
rules to divide an overall dataset into smaller classifica-
tion sets. Using these theoretically diverse algorithms,
we reduce the likelihood of relying on the results of
one algorithm that over-learns the data and fails to
generalize to a broader population.Results and discussion
Table 3 includes the original hypothesis for each con-
struct and associated variable (LIWC category), as well
as the results from each one-tailed independent samples
t-test. In this way, it gives a comparison of linguistic dif-
ferences in the deceptive and truthful conditions.
On average, compared to truthful calls, deceptive 911
calls exhibited greater use of “they” (t(50) = 1.802, p < .05).
They also involved more negation (t(50) = 2.031, p < .05)
and assent terms (t(50) = 1.905, p < .05). Furthermore, they
displayed a higher rate of inhibition terms (t(50) =2.428,
p < .05). In contrast, truthful callers used more numeric
words (t(50) = -2.417, p < .05) and leisure (location-
related) words (t(50) = -2.109, p < .05). The transcripts
for truthful calls contained more negative emotion words
(t(50) = -1.915, p < .05), terms for anxiety (t(50) = -1.975,
p < .05), and leisure (location-related) terms (t(50) = -2.109,
p < .05). Table 2 reports the results of the classification
algorithms for both a training set and a cross-validation
set.
The overall performance of the classification tech-
niques was very strong and ranged from 70% to 84% for
the cross-validation tests. The results yielded predictive
models with much higher accuracy than that of unaided
humans, which, as mentioned above, is 54% [1,2]. The
best classification method used was discriminant ana-
lysis, followed by logistic model tree induction.
Table 4 lists each variable name (LIWC category) with
examples from the transcripts that conform to the re-
sults. In part, the accurate classification performance of
this study may be due to high motivation exhibited by
the callers. DePaulo et al. [28] point out that cues todeception are more evident when individuals are striving
to carry out deception successfully.
The results suggest that truthful callers display more
negative emotion and anxiety than deceivers, who tend
to display flat affect. Although we had hypothesized that
deceivers would use more swear words as an attempt
to appear more credible through a faked emotional re-
sponse, we actually discovered that truth tellers used
more extreme swearing (the mean for truthful swear-
ing = .0652; the mean for deceptive swearing = .0000).
Emotionally charged swearing was another way for
truth tellers to convey negative emotion or frustration
during the calls. This finding corresponds to previous
research that demonstrated that the primary reason
that people swear is to express negative emotions or
frustration [38,39].
Honest callers also tended to refer to others in third-
person singular. To aid emergency responders, truth
tellers used more numbers related to addresses and/or
phone numbers and used names of locations, such as
“apartment” or “garage”.
Deceivers used third-person plural at a higher rate,
perhaps to distance themselves from an incriminating
situation. However, contrary to our hypotheses, they also
demonstrated more immediacy than truth tellers by
using both first-person singular (the mean for truthful
first-person singular = .2964; the mean for deceptive
first-person singular = 1.1760) and first-person plural
pronouns (the mean for truthful first-person plural =
9.4136; the mean for deceptive first-person plural =
10.6788).
Deceivers’ use of negation and agreement words may
have represented their need to suppress or contain their
own verbal responses and/or affect. Finally, deceivers
tended to tell the 911 operator to “wait” or “hold [on]”
(inhibition terms) at a higher rate than truth tellers. This
occurred in the 911 calls when the operator asked them
to do something they were reluctant to do, such as CPR.
The aim of this research was to expand the under-
standing of how we can analyze 911 call transcripts for
crime analysis and solving. Thus, this study makes three
major contributions. First, it has advanced deception
detection research by applying linguistic feature mining
methods to a unique corpus, namely, transcripts of
911 homicide calls, which represents extremely raw and
Table 3 Analysis of constructs/variables (LIWC categories) in transcripts
Constructs Associated variables
(LIWC categories)
Predicted Actual Truthful mean Truthful Std Dev Deceptive mean Deceptive Std Dev
Immediacy 1st person plural T > D D > T .2964 .50586 1.1760 2.15572
1st person singular T > D D > T 9.4136 3.42226 10.6788 4.67963
Non-immediacy 3rd person singular D > T T > D* 5.4756 3.84711 3.7344 3.06803
3rd person plural D > T D > T* .6280 1.16957 1.2652 1.32602
Control Negation D > T D > T* 3.7160 2.18237 4.9892 2.25060
Assent D > T D > T* 4.8160 3.52826 6.9232 4.25887
Felt emotion Negative emotion T > D T > D* 1.5980 1.48383 .8736 1.17341
Anxiety T > D T > D* .3632 .63672 .0904 .26723
Extreme swearing (Sexual) D > T T > D .0652 .15075 .0000 .0000
Cognitive overload Number T > D T > D* 5.5628 5.71633 2.5760 2.34458
Leisure T > D T > D* .7564 .65370 .3560 .68811
Inhibition D > T D > T* .1748 .27091 .4648 .53210
*Significant at p-value < = 0.05.
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mined that deceivers use language and linguistic cues
differently than truth tellers in a high-stakes, real-world
corpus of 911 homicide calls. Thus, this study represents
a successful proof of concept of using automated linguis-
tic analysis to classify deceptive versus truth telling 911
homicide calls accurately, quickly, and objectively in
comparison to manual methods of content analysis, which
involve extensive training, time-consuming analyses, and
subjectivity. Through analysis of 911 calls, law enforce-
ment could detect deceptive, guilty perpetrators earlier in
the investigative process and use that information for
crime analysis. Second, we extracted useful information
from unstructured text comprising transcribed 911 calls
to demonstrate that these largely unexploited data can be
analyzed for further investigative work. Third, this study
provided strong classification results of up to 84%Table 4 Variables (LIWC Categories) with Examples from Tran
Variable Name Direction Truthful Transcript
3rd person singular T > D She's right on the floor.
She's not breathing.
3rd person plural D > T
Negation D > T
Assent D > T
Negative emotion T > D There was a fight. It was terrible.
Anxiety T > D I found out about an hour ago and
I've been in a panic ever since.
Number T > D Five seventeen West Doty Street
Leisure T > D I see her in her garage right now.
Inhibition D > T
Note: Bold-faced type in transcript columns indicates words associated with each raccuracy (cross-validated). These results approach the
highest reported accuracy of field-based polygraph tests
which is 92% [40,41]. Combined with speech-to-text soft-
ware, automated deception detection techniques could be
used to monitor 911 calls in real time. Although the mis-
sion of the 911 operators would remain the same, auto-
mated monitoring of 911 calls could enable law
enforcement and rescue workers to focus efforts and re-
sources more successfully on post-hoc crime solving and
analysis.
Limitations and conclusion
Despite these contributions discussed above, the con-
venience sample of 50 archived 911 homicide calls
downloaded from the Internet represents a limited data-
set. The size of the current dataset was restricted by the
number of publicly available deceptive calls for whichscripts
Deceptive Transcript
Yes, they said, they said if they heard anything
they were going to my house.
No, nothing, he's gone.
Okay, they’re here.
[conversation while the operator is trying to give CPR instructions]
Hold on, I have to throw up, please hold on.
espective variable.
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http://www.security-informatics.com/content/3/1/8ground truth could be established. Furthermore, the 911
calls were taken from the Internet, not the original
source. As a result, some information—such as names—
may have been blocked out to protect the privacy of the
caller when the 911 call was released to the public. An
additional limitation arises from the fact that we did not
control the chain of custody over the 911 calls. Thus, we
are not able to establish whether or to what degree the
911 calls had been edited. Moreover, only certain states
currently release 911 calls to the public, so the geo-
graphic origin of the calls could be skewed. Finally, the
calls were restricted to those placed by English-speaking
callers located in the U.S. To counter these limitations
in the future, audio files and/or transcripts should be
collected directly from law enforcement in subsequent
research to validate our results, and sampling from di-
verse geographical locations should be carried out.
Accurate, credible assessment decisions are critical for
law enforcement personnel, who may not detect decep-
tion, may act on false positives, or may use incorrect in-
formation for crime analyses. Moreover, other clues for
deception, such as vocalic cues, should be studied in
conjunction with linguistic cues for a practical decision
support tool that includes combined analyses. In the fu-
ture, an integrated system for deception detection that
can be used in real time in high-stakes 911 calls could
be added to law enforcement’s overall crime-solving and
crime-analysis strategy. Text mining tools could also be
used to analyze 911 calls linguistically as part of a port-
folio of crime-solving techniques to enable law enforce-
ment and rescue workers to focus their efforts and
resources more successfully.
This study’s findings provide critical knowledge about
how deceivers communicate during typically unre-
hearsed verbal exchanges and expand the usefulness of
deception models from a low-stakes, laboratory setting
into a high-stakes, real-world environment where there
are serious consequences not only for the deceiver, but
also for law enforcement. The next step for this research
will be to validate these results using a larger real-world
dataset. Additionally, when we use a larger dataset, we
can conduct testing of revised hypotheses for 1st person
plural (D > T), 1st person singular (D > T), and swearing
(T > D) to establish if new results are significant in the
revised directions. Current and future quantitative
models and decision aids could assist law enforcement
in detecting deception.
Endnotes
aIn this paper, the term “homicide” includes not only
murders, but also accidents that were later deemed by
investigators to be homicides, reports of kidnapping that
masked an underlying homicide or neglectful death, and
murder-suicides.bA unique characteristic of this dataset that may not
be true in others is that 911 deceivers are treated impli-
citly as truthful by the dispatcher. A 911 dispatcher
operates under the assumption that the caller is telling
the truth. Therefore, a deceptive caller may never change
his story based on his perception that the operator is
suspicious of it.
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